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[S. F. No. 18792. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1953.] 
THE .AETNA CASUALTY .AND SURETY COMP .ANY (a 
Corporation), .Appellant, v. P .ACIFIC GAS AND ELEC-
TRIC COMP .ANY (a Corporation) et al., Defendants; 
BECHTEL CORPORATION (a Corporation), Re-
spondent. 
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Per-
sons- Limitation of Actions.-Employee's general damage 
claim, whether prosecuted by employee personally or by his 
employer or its insurance carrier on his behalf, is solely one 
in tort for personal injuries arising out of negligence of third 
party tort feasor; hence cause of action accrues at time of 
negligent act and, regardless of who may be party plaintiff, is 
governed by one-year statute of limitations applicable to 
personal injury actions (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. 3) rather 
than by three-year statute applicable to liabilities created by 
statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, sub d. 1), there being nothing 
in Lab. Code, §§ 3850-3863, relating to subrogation of em-
ployer to employee's rights of recovery against tort feasor, 
which would indicate intention to impose greater burden on 
tort feasor insofar as time limit of suit is concerned. 
[2] Limitation of Actions-Period of Limitations-Torts.-Code 
Civ. Proc., § 340, suhd. 3, is a special statute controlling time 
within which an action for personal injuries may be com-
menced, and it prevails over general statute applicable to 
actions based on a "liability created by statute." (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 338, subd. 1.) 
[3] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Finality as to Parties.-Non-
appearance of one defendant in an action does not preclude 
judgment, with respect to other defendant which appeared, 
from being a final appealable judgment. 
[1] Statute of Limitations applicable to action by employer or 
insurance carrier subrogated to workmen's compensation claimant's 
rights as against tort feasor, note, 95 A.L.R. 1431. See, also, 
Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 10 et seq.; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 367. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Limitation of Actions, § 102 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 40; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 22. 
McK. Dig. Refere:qces: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 29; [2] 
Limitation of Actions, § 42; [3] Appeal and Error, § 30; [4] 
Workmen's Compensation, §§ 33, 38. 
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[4] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Persons-
Judgment and AppeaL-In action by employer's insurance 
carrier against a third party tort feasor for injuries s11stained 
by employee, cause of action to recover on plaintiff's own 
behalf alleged amount of compensation benefits paid by de-
fendant to injured employee and cause of action to recover as 
statutory trustee for such employee the alleged general dam-
ages suffered by him may be treated as separate matters for 
litigation in discretion of court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 579), 
and judgment of dismissal on cause of action last mentioned 
is a final determination of rights of plaintiff as statutory 
trustee; such judgment should be regarded as having same 
measure of finality as would a similar judgment in action in 
which there were two plaintiffs seeking their respective dam-
ages from same defendant on two severable causes of action, 
and hence is appealable under Code Civ. Proc., § 963. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Theresa Meikle, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action by compensation insurance carrier for damages suf-
fered by employee of insured. Judgment of dismissal affirmed. 
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Van H. Pinney for Appellant. 
Partridge, O'Connell & Whitney and Wallace O'Connell 
for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff is the compensation insurance 
carrier for an employer whose employee sustained an in-
dustrial injury allegedly caused by the negligence of third 
party defendants. In its fourth cause of action plaintiff 
sought to recover the employee's general tort damages. The 
action was brought more than one year but less than three 
years after occurrence of the accident which caused the injury. 
A demurrer to this fourth cause of action was sustained with-
out leave to amend, and from the judgment of dismissal ac-
cordingly entered, plaintiff appeals. 
The determinative question is whether the fourth cause of 
action is governed by the one-year statute of limitations 
applicable to an action for damages ''for the injury to . . . 
one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. 3) or the three-year statute applicable 
to an action "upon a liability created by statute" (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 338, subd. 1). The Labor Code authorizes the em-
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ployer or its insurance carrier to bring an action against 
the third party tort feasor ( §§ 3850, 3852) and to include 
therein the general damages to the employee as well as the 
special damages to the employer for compensation and medical 
benefits ( § 3854). .Assuming, without deciding, that this lia-
bility of the tort feasor to the employer or its insurance car-
rier for the employee's general damages is one created by 
statute (cf. Limited Mutual Comp. Ins. Co. v. Billings, 74 
Cal..App.2d 881, 884-885 [169 P.2d 673], nevertheless under 
settled legal principles the trial COlJ.rt correctly concluded that 
the one-year statute applied. 
[la] The employee's general damage claim, whether prose-
cuted by the employee personally or by his employer or its 
insurance carrier on his behalf, is solely one in tort for 
personal injuries arising out of the negligence of the third 
party tort feasor; hence the cause of action accrues at the 
time of the negligent act. No matter who may be the party 
plaintiff, the cause of action is one within the express terms 
of subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
[2] That section is a special statute controlling the time 
within which any action covering such injury may be com-
menced, and it prevails over the general statute applicable 
to actions based upon a ''liability created by statute.'' (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 1.) In line with this principle, the 
one-year statute has been held applicable to an action for 
personal injuries based upon the liability of the owner of ah 
automobile for imputed negligence of the driver thereof under 
section 402 of the Vehicle Code (Franceschi v. Scott, 7 Cal. 
.App.2d 494, 495-496 [ 46 P.2d 764]) and to an action for 
personal injuries based upon the liability of the driver's 
parents who had signed and verified the driver's application 
for an operator's license as required by section 352 of the 
Vehicle Code (McFarland v. Cordiero, 99 Cal.App. 352, 
354-355 [278 P. 889]). Certainly if such principle applies in 
cases where a new person, by virtue of statutory authority, 
may be sued on a personal injury claim (see Ridley v. Young, 
64 Cal.App.2d 503, 509 [149 P.2d 76] ), it should apply here 
where a new person, under statutory authority, may sue on a 
personal injury claim. [lb] There is nothing in the Labor 
Code ( §§ 3850-3863) which would indicate an intention to 
impose a greater burden on the tort feasor if recovery on the 
employee's damage claim is sought by the employer or its 
insurance carrier rather than the injured employee insofar as 
the time of suit is concerned. The tort liability to respond in 
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general damages of the personal injury claim remains the 
same. To hold otherwise would produce the anomalous result 
whereby the employee's tort action would be barred if he un-
dertook to prosecute it and yet the employer or its insurance 
carrier could recover damages at a later date for the employee 
on that same cause of action. .Accordingly, plaintiff unavail-
ingly argues that its ''fourth cause of action'' is governed by 
the general three-year statute of limitations applicable to a 
"liability created by statute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, 
subd. 1.) 
During the pendency of the appeal it was suggested that 
the judgment of dismissal of the fourth cause of action was 
not a final judgment, and was therefore not appealable. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) Counsel were then asked to stipu-
late regarding the status of the record. .According to their 
stipulation, the complaint was filed with one plaintiff and two 
defendants and embodied four causes of action: the first is 
against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to recover on 
plaintiff's own behalf the sum of $1,684.12, being the alleged 
amount of compensation benefits paid by it to the injured em-
ployee; the second is against the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company to recover as statutory trustee for the injured em-
ployee (Lab. Code, § 3854) the sum of $50,000 being the 
alleged general damages suffered by the injured employee ; 
the third is similar to the first but against Bechtel Corpora-
tion to recover on plaintiff's own behalf the same alleged 
amount of compensation benefits paid by it to the injured 
employee; and the fourth is similar to the second but against 
Bechtel Corporation to recover as statutory trustee for the 
injured employee the same alleged general damages suffered 
by him. Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company has 
never appeared in the action. 
[3] The nonappearance of defendant Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company in this action does not preclude the judg-
ment with respect to the other appearing defendant from 
being a final appealable judgment. (Rocca v. Steinmetz, 
189 Cal. 426, 428 [208 P. 964]; Howe v. Key System Transit 
Co., 198 Cal. 525, 529 [246 P. 39]; Young v. Superior Court, 
16 Cal.2d 211, 215 [105 P.2d 363]; Weisz v. McKee, 31 Cal. 
A.pp.2d 144, 147 [87 P.2d 379].) [4] While there appears 
to be no authority on the effect of the admitted nonadjudica-
tion of the third cause of action in relation to the fina:lity of 
the judgment entered on the fourth cause of action in favor of 
the same defendant, Bechtel Corporation, practical considera-
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tions and legal principles sustain the propriety of treating 
these two causes of action as separate matters for litigation 
in the discretion of the court. (See Code Civ. Pro c., § 579.) 
The judgment on the fourth cause of action was a final 
determination of the rights of plaintiff as statutory trustee 
seeking to recover general damages for the benefit of the 
injured employee. As a final determination of the rights of 
plaintiff in that capacity, such judgment should be regarded 
as having the same measure of finality as would a similar 
judgment in an action in which there were two plaintiffs 
seeking their respective damages from the same defendant on 
two severable causes of action: (1) the insurance carrier 
for recovery of its own compensation expenditures; and (2) 
the injured employee for recovery of his own general damages. 
Such cases as Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174], 
and Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100], in-
volve an entirely different situation in that there each of the 
successive judgments left undetermined between the same 
parties in their same individual capacities another alleged 
cause or causes of action for the same identical relief. Under 
the circumstances here, we conclude that the judgment of 
dismissal of the fourth cause of action is a final judgment 
within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and is therefore appealable. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The appeal in this case should be dismissed as there is no 
final judgment, but if the case is to be decided on its merits, 
the three-year statute of limitation for a liability created by 
statute is applicable, and the judgment should be reversed. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 338(1).) 
On the question of appeal, it appears that there is yet no 
final judgment in the action from which an appeal may be 
taken. The record shows that the complaint on file purported 
to state four causes of action. The first asserts negligence 
on the part of one defendant, Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
pany, resulting in injury to Cabella, an employee of plain-
tiff's insured, in the course of his employment and the pay-
ment of workmen's compensation to him. The second re-
alleges the allegations of the first and claims Cabella was 
damaged by the injury in the sum of $50,000. In the third, 
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the allegations of the first are again adopted and it alleges 
another defendant, Bechtel, was also negligent, and claim is 
made for payments made for workmen's compensation. The 
fourth realleges the third and claims damages to Cabella of 
$50,000. 
Apparently defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
did not demur. At any rate, that is not here important. 
The third and fourth causes of action were for defendant 
Bechtel's negligence in injuring Cab ella, the employee, the 
third asking as damages only the amount paid by plaintiff 
to Cabella for workmen's compensation and the fourth for 
additional damages suffered by Cabella. The demurrer was 
sustained as to the fourth cause only and the judgment entered 
dismissed that cause of action only. The appeal was taken 
from that judgment. That judgment is not appealable for 
there can be but one judgment in an action. After trial on the 
third cause of action is had, another judgment would be 
entered. That is to say, there cannot be separate judgments 
on different causes of action where the same parties are in-
volved. The judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action 
is interlocutory and hence not appealable. (Mather v. Mather, 
5 Cal.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174] ; Bank of America v. Superior 
Court, 20 Cal.2d 697 [128 P.2d 357] ; Greenfield v. Mather, 
14 Cal.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100] ; Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 
116 [199 P.2d 668] .) The rule is stated in Bank of America 
v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701: "They assume 
that there can be a piecemeal disposition of the several counts 
of a complaint. They assume, when there is more than one 
count in a complaint, and a demurrer is interposed and sus-
tained, and a judgment of dismissal entered, that there are as 
many separate judgments as there are counts in the complaint. 
That is not the law. There cannot be a separate judgment as 
to one count in a complaint containing several counts. On 
the contrary, there can be but one judgment in an action no 
matter how many counts the complaint contains. (De Vally 
v. Kendall De Vally 0. Co., Ltd., 220 Cal. 742 [32 P. (2d) 
638]; Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. (2d) 617 [55 P. (2d) 1174]; 
Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 130 Cal.App. 510 
[20 P. (2d) 129] .) In the De Vally case, supra, a demurrer 
was sustained and a judgment entered dismissing two counts 
of a four-count complaint. The court held that the judgment 
was premature, and dismissed the appeal from it, and stated 
( p. 7 45) : 'Although the matter is not mentioned by counsel 
for either side, it appears that the court should not have 
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given a judgment herein until the final disposition of the 
entire cause. The law contemplates but one :final judgment 
in a cause. .As stated in the case of N o~an v. Smith, 137 Cal. 
360, 361 [ 70 Pac. 166], quoting from Stockton etc. W arks v. 
Glen Fa.lls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. (557) 577 [33 Pac. 633]: "There 
can be but one :final judgment in an action, and that is one 
which in effect ends the suit in the court in which it was 
entered, and :finally determines the rights of the parties in 
relation to the matter in controversy." ' This language was 
approved in the Potvin case, supra, where the court said 
(p. 512): 'Since a :final judgment in an action contemplates a 
complete adjudication of the rights of the parties and a :final 
determination of the matter in controversy, it is apparent 
that the so-called judgment rendered upon the sustaining 
of a demurrer to one cause of action of a complaint without 
leave to amend, leaving :five other causes of action unimpaired 
presenting matters to be litigated during a trial of the issues 
of fact, cannot be regarded as a :final determination and dis-
posal of the cause.' " 
The majority seeks to escape this rule by stating that be-
cause plaintiff was suing in one capacity in the third count 
of the complaint, that is, in his own right, and in the fourth 
count, as trustee for his injured employee, the judgment 
entered on the fourth count is a final judgment. That is to 
say, there could be two :final judgments in the case, one on 
the third count and the other on the fourth count. The reason 
given is that it would be like a case where two plaintiffs, each 
seeking damages from the same defendant on ''severable'' 
causes of action, one being by the insurance carrier for its 
compensation expenditures and the other by the employee for 
his personal injuries. 
The reasoning is faulty. The basic notion of one single 
judgment as stated in all the cases hereinabove cited is that 
all the factual issues should be settled in one judgment, unless 
on a collateral matter one of several parties presents issues 
which are finally adjudicated as to him. In the instant case 
there are not two parties plaintiff in any true sense because 
the recovery by plaintiff on either cause of action rests upon 
identical issues: Was the defendant negligent? Was plain-
tiff's injured employee contributively negligent? If defendant 
was negligent and plaintiff's employee not, how much damages 
has the latter suffered? Plaintiff as employer is not entitled 
to recover any amount on his own behalf unless he is entitled 
to recover on behalf of his employee, and if he is entitled 
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to recover on behalf of the latter, the right of the employer 
to recover what he has paid in compensation and medical 
expenses follows as a matter of course; there is really no 
issue on the right to recover those two items of damage. Hence 
there cannot be any finality to a judgment as to the employer 
and not as to the employee or vice versa, whether either or 
both or one or the other is suing. Thus, this is not in fact a 
severable action to the extent at least that two judgments are 
required or proper. 
The law authorizes these causes of action to be joined, and 
it is at least doubtful that they could be brought separately. 
Certainly, if they were brought separately, a judgment on one 
as to liability would be res judicata as to the other. Suppose 
the statute of limitation had not run, could plaintiff now 
bring another action on behalf of the employee 1 It seems 
obvious to me that it could not. Then how can separate judg-
ments be rendered in this action if only one action could be 
brought? 
With reference to the statute of limitation, the majority 
holds that inasmuch as a personal injury is involved the one-
year statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 340(3)) applies rather than 
the three-year period for a statutory liability. That conclusion 
is reached by construing the provision relating to an injury 
to a person as being special or particular whereas the one deal-
ing with statutory liability is general and the particular con-
trols over the general. The effect of this holding is that every 
action or proceeding mentioned in the limitation statutes pre-
vails over the statutory liability provision regardless of 
whether the liability is or is not created by statute. This is 
true because all of them would be particular, like an injury to 
a person, and thus controlling over the statutory liability sec-
tion. The result is to give to the statutory liability section 
no more effect than if it were an omnibus or catch-all pro-
VISion. That it was not intended as such is plain. The 
Legislature has expressly enacted such a statute. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 343.) The statutory liability section is read out of 
the books as the test is no longer whether or not the liability 
is created by statute, as all the previous authorities supposed, 
it is whether there is some other provision fitting the case. 
There is no basis for the assumption that the personal 
injury section is particular and the statutory liability gen-
eral. On the contrary, there are undoubtedly more of the 
former than of the latter. 
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The cases demonstrate that the test of whether a liability 
js created by statute and thus controlled by the limitation 
statute, is whether, except for the statute there would not be 
liability; the test is not that stated by the majoriy. In 
Barber v. Mulford, 117 Cal. 356 [ 49 P. 206], it was held 
that a mandamus proceeding to compel the payment of a claim 
against a county based on contract was a statutory liability 
because it was the county's duty by statute to pay it. Re-
covery of commissions by the district attorney on moneys col-
lected by him from the county is governed by the three-year 
statute, not the two-year period for liabilities not founded on 
a written instrument. (Ht~gby v. Calaveras County, 18 Cal. 
176.) An action on the official bond of an officer is con-
trolled by the three-year statutory liability provision although 
the bond is a contract. (County of Sonoma v. Hall, 132 Cal. 
589 [62 P. 257, 312, 65 P. 12, 459]; Norton v. Title Guaranty 
&; Surety Co., 176 Cal. 212 [168 P. 16] ; Hellwig v. Title etc. 
Co., 39 Cal.App. 422 [179 P. 222].) 
Here it is clear that in the absence of statute the employer 
would have no cause of action for injuries suffered by his em-
ployee, hence, the liability, if any, is created by statute, and 
the three-year statute of limitation applies. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with Mr. Justice Carter that the appeal should be 
dismissed for the reasons set forth in his opinion. 
